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ABSTRACT
Can popular sovereignty and sovereign territory coexist? Can
countries exchange sovereign territory consistently with the principle of
self-determination? What if countries’ rights to territorial integrity were
predicated on corresponding duties to govern well? And can the
international system provide mechanisms and incentives to improve the
status quo?
These questions are not simply academic. Across the world, many
regions are located in the wrong nations—wrong in the sense that the
people of these regions believe they would be safer, happier, and
wealthier if surrounded by different borders and governed by different
leaders. Such people might be able to improve their lot by emigrating
or voting out their current government, but those are imperfect
solutions and are often unavailable to those who need them most. We
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ask how international law could help ameliorate the bad-government
problem by facilitating welfare-enhancing border changes.
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INTRODUCTION
The location of borders shapes national identities, determines the
ownership of valuable resources, and establishes who can claim various
legal rights and benefits. Throughout history, people have fought and
died to claim, protect, cross, or otherwise because of borders.1
But even as borders shape people’s lives, people reshape them in
return. Although the boundaries of sovereign territory are often
delineated by natural features like mountains or rivers, they are
ultimately products of human agency.2 And in a broader sense, many
of the ongoing debates in international law—those regarding refugees,
remedial secession, the responsibility to protect, and fiduciary duties,
to take a few prominent examples—are very much about the
relationship between sovereignty, territory, and people. To the extent
that sovereignty is territorial (as it tends to be under traditional
conceptions), countries may be able to resist popular will; to the extent
that sovereignty resides in the people, the significance of territory
seems to dissolve.3 But of course, neither option is fully satisfactory
because sovereignty, territory, and people all seem to matter.
Our goal in this Article is to account for sovereign territory in a
world where sovereignty ultimately resides with the people.4 The
challenge is designing a framework that respects, to the degree
possible, both popular sovereignty and nations’ territorial integrity. We

1. Tayyab Mahmud, Colonial Cartographies, Postcolonial Borders, and Enduring Failures
of International Law: The Unending Wars Along the Afghanistan-Pakistan Frontier, 36 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 1, 2 (2010); Steven R. Ratner, Land Feuds and Their Solutions: Finding International Law
Beyond the Tribunal Chamber, 100 AM. J. INT’L. L. 808, 809 (2006).
2. See, e.g., ALBERTO ALESINA & ENRICO SPOLAORE, THE SIZE OF NATIONS 1–2 (2003)
(criticizing international economists for treating borders as exogenous); Frank Jacobs & Parag
Khanna, The New World, N.Y. TIMES: BORDERLINES (Sept. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.
com/interactive/2012/09/23/opinion/sunday/the-new-world.html [https://perma.cc/E5BN-YE2N]
(“[H]istory chews up borders with the same purposeless determination that geology does, as
seaside villas slide off eroding coastal cliffs.”).
3. See generally Thomas J. Biersteker, State, Sovereignty and Territory, in HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 157 (Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse & Beth A. Simmons eds.,
2002) (demonstrating that the meaning of statehood has changed over time as a function of social
context).
4. We use “region” to refer to geographic territory and the people living on it, and—where
greater specificity seems necessary—will use “people of a region” or “regional population” to
refer to the people alone. For the most part, we are not concerned here with unoccupied territory,
nor with displaced persons. As to the latter, we propose a conceptually similar partial solution to
the refugee crisis in Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Competing for Refugees: A Market-Based
Solution to a Humanitarian Crisis, 48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 53 (2016) [hereinafter, Blocher
& Gulati, Competing for Refugees].
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attempt to do so by describing a “market” for sovereignty in which
citizens of a region—as a collective—have tradable ownership rights,5
and countries—with citizens’ approval—trade sovereign control over
territory.6 In situations involving oppression, transfers could occur
without the parent nation’s approval, sometimes even without
compensation. Such a market would provide a mechanism for welfareenhancing border changes while accommodating both the selfdetermination rights of citizens and the sovereign rights of nations to
control their territory. It would permit a mechanism for peaceful
secession. And by encouraging cross-border competition among
governments, it could improve democratic responsiveness and increase
governments’ incentives to treat their citizens well.7
We refer to this framework as a market because it involves
competition and transfers of a valued resource, but it is designed to
maximize good governance rather than financial profit.8 In most
countries, would-be governments already compete with each other for
sovereign control—that is a basic characteristic of democracy. But this
competition occurs within the limits of each country’s institutions,
politics, and economics. And there are situations in which a particular
region either has no effective voice in this process or is not able to
thrive regardless of which domestic political party prevails. Under the
current system, the people of that region might try to emigrate to other
nations that are willing to have them and where they believe they can

5. We are not the first to suggest the utility of analogies to private law. See HERSCH
LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 91 (1927)
(“The part of international law upon which private law has engrafted itself most deeply is that
relating to acquisition of sovereignty over land . . . .”). See generally id. (presenting private-law
analogies in the realm of territorial sovereignty). For a similar argument focused on
intragovernmental bargaining, see generally Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 1595 (2014).
6. For the argument in the context of border sales between U.S. states, see generally Joseph
Blocher, Selling State Borders, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 241 (2014). See also If States Traded Territory,
ECONOMIST: THE WORLD IF (May 16, 2016, 6:46 PM), http://worldif.economist.com/article/
12138/country-market [https://perma.cc/DH5A-Y6EB].
7. Though there are fundamental differences, the idea of a market for sovereign control
shares features with the market for corporate control. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer,
94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981) (arguing that corporate managers should passively accept outside
tender offers to increase shareholder welfare); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for
Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965) (proposing that mergers among competitors
would be more efficient than allowing a competitor to eventually go bankrupt).
8. We explore the market analogy further in Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Markets and
Sovereignty (June 11, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2794501
[https://perma.cc/QVV8-ZPJD] [hereinafter, Blocher & Gulati, Markets and Sovereignty].
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thrive. But emigrating is difficult—particularly for the poor, weak, or
oppressed—and breaks up families and communities. What if, instead
of a subset of the most productive and capable individuals emigrating
to a new nation,9 the new nation could come to them? A market for
sovereign control would allow dissatisfied regions to “vote” for
governments beyond their current borders.
There is reason to think that, at least in some cases, other nations
will be interested in accepting these new territories. The drive to
expand sovereign control has always been powerful,10 and sovereignty
is already “for sale” in various forms. Governments often sell
servitudes to one another11 and lease territory to foreign investors12 in
ways that directly or indirectly limit their own sovereign control.13
Nations seek control over territory for ports, military bases, farmland,14
9. See, e.g., Stacey Vanek Smith, Tiny Island Nation Kicks Off Trend of Selling Citizenship,
NAT’L PUBLIC RADIO (Mar. 10, 2016, 3:56 PM), http://www.npr.org/2016/03/10/469972509/tinyisland-nation-kicks-off-trend-of-selling-citizenship [https://perma.cc/YEQ9-NRPT]; Peter Wise,
Sea, Sun and Easy Visas Lure China Buyers, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2014, 6:19 PM), http://www.ft.
com/cms/s/2/d7c1b472-44a6-11e4-ab0c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz4IvGfqRX1 [https://perma.cc/3N
2G-BJ5Q] (“‘The market for investor residence permits consists essentially of wealthy people
living in countries they feel to be politically, economically or religiously unstable,’ says Charles
Roberts, whose Fine & Country real estate firm has sold about 100 properties to Chinese.”).
10. Andrew F. Burghardt, The Bases of Territorial Claims, 63 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 225,
225 (1973) (“Virtually all states and empires have treated territory as being of itself good.”); see
also id. (“[T]he wish to acquire more [territory] is admittedly a very natural and common thing;
and when men succeed in this they are always praised rather than condemned.” (quoting
NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 42 (George Bull trans., Penguin Books ed. 1961) (1513)));
Bernard H. Oxman, The Territorial Temptation: A Siren Song at Sea, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 830, 830
(2006) (“The history of international law since the Peace of Westphalia is in significant measure
an account of the territorial temptation.”).
11. PETER STRAUSS, THE VIABILITY OF TERRITORIAL LEASES IN RESOLVING
INTERNATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTES 91–97 (2010).
12. See, e.g., Duncan Bartlett, Ethiopia Weighs Benefits of Foreign ‘Land Grabs,’ BBC NEWS
(June 10, 2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-13725431 [https://perma.cc/QUR4-4XY7];
Alex Spillius, China ‘to Rent Five Per Cent of Ukraine,’ TELEGRAPH (Sept. 24, 2013, 7:18 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/10332007/China-to-rent-five-per-cent-ofUkraine.html [https://perma.cc/Z6CZ-JCGB].
13. Jochen von Bernstorff, The Global “Land-Grab”, Sovereignty and Human Rights, 2
ESIL REFLECTIONS 1, 3 (Oct. 18, 2013), http://www.esil-sedi.eu/node/426 [https://perma.cc/D994957B] (noting that when governments enter into large-scale land deals with foreign investors,
“territorial sovereignty is affected for instance if large parts of the territory is [sic] leased to
foreign governments for a period of 99 years, which is a standard clause in these land deals”). See
generally PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY PRIVATIZATION OF
GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT
(2007) (arguing that the use of private contractors to perform essential government functions can
undermine the effectiveness and morale of public government officials).
14. See John Vidal, How Food and Water Are Driving a 21st-Century African Land Grab,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 7, 2010, 12:06 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/mar/07/
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canals,15 tax revenue, trade gains,16 and other reasons.17 On the sellers’
side, countries might generally be reluctant to part with territory, but
they could be willing to do so when they are in serious economic need18
or could achieve security or political goals by doing so.19 Nations
already enter into agreements by which they yield authority over
government functions such as the administration of law20 and military
defense.21
In this regard, the framework we have in mind would be largely
consistent with existing international law, but that consistency
illuminates at least two problems with the current legal structure. First,
food-water-africa-land-grab [https://perma.cc/7597-BF2F] (“Ethiopia is only one of 20 or more
African countries where land is being bought or leased for intensive agriculture on an immense
scale in what may be the greatest change of ownership since the colonial era.”).
15. Jude Webber, Nicaragua Breaks Ground with $50bn Canal, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2014,
4:53 AM), http://on.ft.com/1wYBUHe [https://perma.cc/35CC-HTFD] (describing the Chinesefunded project).
16. Nancy Birdsall, The True True Size of Africa, CTR. FOR GLOB. DEV. BLOG (Nov. 11,
2010), http://www.cgdev.org/blog/true-true-size-africa [https://perma.cc/E6GW-RHTK] (noting
that Africa’s “economic size” is roughly equivalent to that of Chicago plus Atlanta, which is “why
Africa’s leaders wish they could overcome the politics of sovereignty and eliminate the cost of all
those borders—something the Europeans have been working on for half a century”).
17. See Andrea Janus, Turks and Caicos Premier “Not Closing the Door” on
Canadians’ Caribbean Dreams, CTV NEWS (May 26, 2014, 12:39 PM), http://www.ctvnews.
ca/politics/turks-and-caicos-premier-not-closing-the-door-on-canadians-caribbean-dreams-1.183
8466 [https://perma.cc/P26M-93ZQ] (quoting Peter Goldring, a member of the Canadian
parliament, on the century-old idea of acquiring Turks and Caicos: “The United States has a
Hawaii. Why can’t Canada have a Hawaii?”); The Market for State Territory: Pass the Hemlock,
ECONOMIST (Nov. 19, 2011) (“Arturas Zuokas, the mayor of Vilnius, has made a teasing offer to
Greece; he suggested his country acquire an island as ‘an exclusive place for rest in the
Mediterranean’ and ‘a great global advert for Lithuania,’ featuring a spa, museums and a
theatre.”).
18. See, e.g., Elena Moya, Greece Starts Putting Island Land Up for Sale to Save Economy,
GUARDIAN (June 24, 2010, 9:33 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/24/greeceislands-sale-save-economy [https://perma.cc/T9VV-5841].
19. See generally Timothy William Waters, The Blessing of Departure: Acceptable and
Unacceptable State Support for Demographic Transformation: The Lieberman Plan to Exchange
Populated Territories in Cisjordan, 2 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 1 (2008) (describing and
defending the legality of the Lieberman Plan, through which Israel would exchange some territory
with the Palestinian Authority).
20. The Privy Council in London hears appeals from more than a dozen independent
nations. On a more limited scale, the Netherlands ceded land to Scotland from 1999 until 2002 for
the sole purpose of conducting a trial of the Lockerbie bombers. Uncertain Future for Camp Zeist,
BBC NEWS (Mar. 14, 2002, 10:31 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1870685.stm [https://perma.cc/
98R9-R9UD].
21. A handful of nations—including Costa Rica, Samoa, and Andorra—have no military and
have “contracted” for protection through treaties. Others, including Palau and the Marshall
Islands, are associated with another nation (the United States for those two) and receive
protection for that reason.
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traditional conceptions of international law permit nations to cede
territory whether or not the territory’s residents give their consent. The
market we describe would impose an additional restriction—the
approval of the ceded region—that would reflect the evolving norm of
self-determination.
Second, the oft-conflicting principles of territorial sovereignty and
self-determination—the latter of which has gained support in recent
decades, though its legal status remains unclear—seem to force a
choice between two absolutes: a default rule giving total sovereignty to
parent nations and a narrow exception that transfers sovereignty to the
people of a region in cases of extreme oppression, such as systematic
human rights violations or genocide.22 It is unclear what fills the
area in between—where the people of a region are systematically
disadvantaged but not severely oppressed.
Drawing from existing concepts in international law, we propose
a rule to fill this gap: where a parent nation has failed to provide
representation or equal treatment to a region,23 the nation’s
entitlement to sovereign control becomes subject to a liability rule
rather than a property rule. The parent nation, therefore, loses the
power to forbid a cession but remains entitled to compensation set by
the market (subject to review by a third party such as the ICJ).24

22. The United Nations has declared, for example, that “all peoples have the right freely to
determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic,
social and cultural development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in accordance
with the provisions of the Charter.” G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 123 (Oct. 24, 1970).
A few paragraphs later, however, the same declaration clarifies:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging
any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity
or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as
described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people
belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.
Id. at 124. These statements are hard to reconcile.
23. This standard comes from the Vienna Convention, which suggests that territorial
sovereignty is predicated on representativeness and equal treatment. See infra note 94 and
accompanying text.
24. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (identifying property
rules and liability rules as basic forms of legal entitlement). Although they are not exactly
voluntary from the perspective of the parent nations, we consider these liability-rule transactions
as part of the broader market for sovereign control. In Calabresi and Melamed’s framework,
values under a liability framework are assigned by a third party, rather than by a market—our
framework combines elements of each. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE FUTURE OF LAW &
ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN REFORM AND RECOLLECTION 129 (2016) (noting that “liability-rule
charges often look like, and are properly described as, prices”).
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Our framework therefore fills a gap in the legal system between
the historical conception of regions as the property of the parent nation
and the modern principle of self-determination in cases of human
rights violations. That gap can be filled by a rule that, by allowing easier
regional exit, incentivizes parent nations to treat their marginal regions
better (for fear that the region will attempt to exit) and parent nations
and regions to split up earlier when the relationship is not working (by
providing for higher returns to both sides from an earlier exit).
As with any conceptual framework, we do not expect this proposal
to translate directly into practice, nor is it our goal to redraw the world
map. Yet the potential practical implications are significant. Many
contemporary borders were drawn at the whim of colonial
administrators.25 Others are products of military conquest or royal
decree, such as the King of X bequeathing a dowry for his daughter’s
marriage to the King of Y.26 Though time has transformed some of
these idiosyncrasies into stable national identities, other undesirable
boundaries have worsened. Whatever the cause, the result is that some
populated regions are in the “wrong” countries, and some sovereigns
have contemplated changing borders through market transactions in
the way this Article describes. Consider the following:
•

Threatened by a rising ocean, the island nation of Kiribati
recently purchased territory in Fiji.27 The Maldives face a
similar problem and are considering a similar solution.28
What rules of international law govern these purchases?

25. See, e.g., Tarek Osman, Why Border Lines Drawn with a Ruler in WW1 Still Rock the
Middle East, BBC NEWS (Dec. 14, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25299553
[https://perma.cc/78G9-65WL] (describing the much-loathed Sykes–Picot border line and its
relationship to the current conflict in Iraq and Syria).
26. See Anthony Farrington, Trading Places: The East India Company and Asia, 52 HIST.
TODAY 5, 40 (2002) (noting that Portugal gave Bombay to the British empire as part of the dowry
of Catherine of Braganza, daughter of King John IV of Portugal, who married King Charles II of
Britain); see also ALASTAIR BONNETT, UNRULY PLACES 183 (2014) (recounting the story of twohundred enclaves near the India–Bangladesh border that were “won or lost in a chess game
between the Maharajah of Cooch Behar and the Nawab of Rangpur in the early eighteenth
century”).
27. Laurence Caramel, Besieged by the Rising Tides of Climate Change, Kiribati Buys Land
in Fiji, GUARDIAN (July 1, 2014, 1:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/
2014/jul/01/kiribati-climate-change-fiji-vanua-levu [https://perma.cc/4Q59-VJ32]. The purchase
does not seem to have conferred full sovereignty, and, unsurprisingly, this exchange faces many
practical and political obstacles. See James Ellsmoor & Zachary Rosen, Kiribati’s Land Purchase
in Fiji: Does It Make Sense?, DEVPOLICYBLOG (Jan. 11, 2016), http://devpolicy.org/kitibatis-landpurchase-in-fiji-does-it-make-sense-20160111 [https://perma.cc/Y528-P2VL].
28. Ellsmoor & Rosen, supra note 27.
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In the lead-up to the Falklands War, several of Margaret
Thatcher’s senior advisors suggested that the United
Kingdom avoid the conflict with Argentina by “buying out”
the few thousand residents living in the Falkland Islands
and associated islands, offering them $100,000 per family to
settle in Britain, Australia, or New Zealand.29 But the plan
was shelved and a thousand lives were lost in the ensuing
war. Now, the United Kingdom spends around $100 million
annually to maintain a military presence on the islands,30
Argentina continues to demand their return, and the
islanders themselves have voted overwhelmingly to
maintain their U.K. citizenship—which, in turn, is the
primary reason for the British military presence.31 What if
Argentina offered the islanders $1 million each to approve
a change?32

•

In 1997, the United Kingdom ceded sovereign control of
Hong Kong to China. Suppose that, having now had nearly
twenty years of experience under Chinese rule, a
supermajority of Hong Kong’s residents would like to
return to British control.33 Can the people of Hong Kong
pay China to shift sovereignty back to the United
Kingdom?34

805

Our framework suggests possible solutions, drawn partially from
market design, to these difficult practical questions. The first Part of
29. Ronaldo Munck, Malvinas: Politics, Territory and Internationalism, 3 GLOBAL
DISCOURSE 151, 153 (2013).
30. INT’L AFFAIRS & DEFENCE SECTION, THE DEFENCE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, 2012,
HC SN06201, at 6 (UK) (giving annual projections from 2006 through 2011).
31. Argentina President Cristina Kirchner Renews Falkland Islands Claim at UN
Meeting, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 7, 2013, 4:44 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
southamerica/falklandislands/10227319/Argentina-President-Cristina-Kirchner-renews-Falkland
-Islands-claim-at-UN-meeting.html [https://perma.cc/H2LQ-LPAT].
32. See infra notes 150–51 and accompanying text.
33. Phila Siu & Tony Cheung, Poll Finds Fewer Hongkongers Identifying as Chinese, Thanks
to Occupy, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 11, 2014, 4:49 AM), http://www.scmp.com/news/hongkong/article/1636818/poll-finds-fewer-hongkongers-identifying-chinese-thanks-occupy [https://
perma.cc/W4UT-XKS3] (reporting a Chinese university survey showing that “Hongkongers’
sense of Chinese identity has hit a record low”); Poll Says Hong Kongers Would Prefer British
Rule, RADIO FREE ASIA (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/hong-kong03142013141313.html [https://perma.cc/S54Q-HERG] (reporting informal online poll suggesting
that more than 90 percent of Hong Kongers would vote to rejoin the United Kingdom).
34. China Blocks British MPs’ Visit to Hong Kong, BBC NEWS (Nov. 30, 2014), http://
www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-30267026 [https://perma.cc/KCT3-H36N] (quoting Lord Patten, a
former British governor of Hong Kong: “When China asserts that what is happening in Hong
Kong is nothing to do with us, we should make it absolutely clear . . . that it is not the case”).
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the Article identifies the existing international rules, including their
contradictions and gaps, and suggests alterations that would better
reflect ascendant principles like that of self-determination. The second
Part proposes a conceptual framework to facilitate welfare-enhancing
changes in sovereign control. The third Part attempts to answer the
most forceful criticisms we anticipate, and the fourth discusses caveats
and complications.
I. THE LEGALITY OF TRANSFERRING SOVEREIGN CONTROL
International law is obsessed with borders. In many ways, the
international legal order depends on them.35 Borders delineate
nations36 and are the building blocks of international law and politics.
It is unsurprising, then, that international law has developed doctrines
and institutions to address issues like cession of sovereign territory and
border disputes. Although our proposed framework tries to respect
existing rules—which is not always easy, given the internal tensions and
conflicts of international law—it would require some changes to the
current system.37
Current international law identifies at least two starkly distinct
scenarios in which sovereign authority and quality of governance are
related. If a region faces severe oppression or genocide, it can leave for
free. If not, the parent nation can cede and acquire territory as it wishes
with no need for regional approval. These paradigm cases track the
underlying legal concepts of self-determination and remedial secession
on the one hand and territorial sovereignty on the other. The
legitimacy of remedial secession remains quite controversial in
international law, and it may be too soon to call it a “rule.” But we
accept it for purposes of the current analysis.38
In addition to embracing the contested principle of remedial
secession, this framework incorporates three legal changes that better
reflect modern trends in international law. First, nations seeking to
abandon or transfer a region must first obtain the approval of that
35. See Jan Paulsson, Boundary Disputes Into the Twenty-First Century: Why, How . . . and
Who?, 95 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 122, 128 (2001).
36. PAUL GILBERT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATIONALISM 91 (1998).
37. For discussion of the requirement that nations permit regional votes, see infra notes 80–
81 and accompanying text. For discussion of the requirement that citizens in realigned regions
receive citizenship in the new country, see infra note 85 and accompanying. For a description of
“liability rule” protection for countries that deny representation or equal rights, see infra notes
89–94.
38. See infra Part II.B.
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region’s citizens. This additional restriction would help account for the
self-determination interests of the relevant region and could (perhaps
paradoxically) encourage more transfers by legitimizing them.
Second is the introduction of the liability-rule regime.39 Even
under the principle of remedial secession, the only way a region can
currently exit against the wishes of the parent nation is if there is
extremely severe oppression. In our proposed system, by contrast, a
nation that substantially fails to satisfy its fiduciary-type obligations to
a region would have to let that region depart, but would be entitled to
compensation. This middle ground would fill the gap between the two
extremes.
Third, we envision sovereigns evaluating foreign regions to see
whether they could ally with those regions for mutual benefit. Under
the current international law regime, even the contemplation of such a
possibility could be seen as a violation of territorial sovereignty. But
for a market to work, it is important for outside nations to consider
whether other nations are underperforming in the management of their
own regions.
A. The Traditional Rule: Territorial Sovereignty and National
Control
There are two primary sources of international law: treaties and
custom. Because there is no general treaty regarding sales of sovereign
territory,40 the relevant international rules for this analysis are derived
from customary international law (CIL). Under the textbook
definition, CIL is present if two conditions are satisfied: (1) widespread
practice among nations and (2) performance of that practice by states
out of a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris).41 Given the near
impossibility of identifying the subjective intentions of states, the
39. See infra Part II.C.
40. Background treaty obligations regarding debt, political alliances, and so on could be
implicated by a sale of sovereign control, but international law has already created tools that
might be useful for that task. See 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 224
(Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) (“When by cession or otherwise, a part of a
state’s territory is transferred to another, a succession to certain rights and obligations associated
with the transferred territory occurs.”). See generally Vienna Convention on the Succession of
States in Respect of Treaties, Aug. 23, 1978, 1946 U.N.T.S 3 (setting rules for the succession of
states, but not providing for sales).
41. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (defining CIL as the law of the international community
that “results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of
legal obligation”).
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doctrine translates as a practical matter into an examination of actual
state practices and inferences from those practices, along with a
consideration of whether other states have objected to those practices
or accepted them as legal.42
To satisfy the first part of the test—an evaluation of state
practice—we must identify transfers of sovereign territory that were
not said to violate international law. Such examples are widespread. In
part, the historical record shows that there have been many sales of
territorial control between sovereigns at peace with one another.
Examples in U.S. history include the purchases of Louisiana from
France in 1803,43 Florida from Spain in 1819,44 Alaska from Russia in
1867,45 and the Virgin Islands from Denmark in 1916.46 Similar
examples abound across the globe.47 Bombay (now Mumbai), for
example, was part of the 1661 dowry given by the Portuguese to King
Charles II of Britain.48
In addition to peaceful transfers, nations often buy and sell
territory at the end of an armed conflict. After its war with Mexico, the
United States purchased 525,000 square miles for $15 million and an
agreement to assume claims against Mexico by private citizens living in
that territory.49 After the Spanish-American War, it purchased the
42. See generally MAURICE MENDELSOHN, THE FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1998) (describing this approach).
43. The United States paid France $15 million for nine-hundred-thousand square miles of
territory. See JON KUKLA, A WILDERNESS SO IMMENSE: THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE
DESTINY OF AMERICA 335 (2003).
44. See Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits Between the United States of America and
His Catholic Majesty, Spain-U.S., Feb. 22, 1819, 8 Stat. 252.
45. The United States paid Russia $7.2 million for 586,412 square miles of territory. See
Treaty Concerning the Cession of the Russian Possessions in North America by His Majesty the
Emperor of All the Russias to the United States of America, art. VI, Russ.-U.S., Mar. 30, 1867,
15 Stat. 539.
46. The United States purchased the Danish West Indies from Denmark, in the process
ceding U.S. claims to portions of Greenland. See Treaty on Cession of the Danish West Indies,
Den.-U.S., Aug. 4, 1916, 39 Stat. 1706.
47. Germany, for example, purchased the Caroline Islands and Northern Mariana Islands
from Spain in 1899 for 25 million pesetas. See German-Spanish Treaty of 1899, Ger.-Spain, Feb.
12, 1899, Gaceta de Madrid, 1 de Julio de 1899 (Spain), http://www.boe.es/datos/pdfs/BOE/
1899/182/A00001-00001.pdf [https://perma.cc/K34T-8LBR]; see also ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 128 (1947) (noting that “[t]reaties of the medieval
type, by which a prince in one way or another, might dispose of his territory, are still found” in
the 1700s).
48. See supra note 26.
49. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement Between the United States of
America and the United Mexican States Concluded at Guadalupe Hidalgo, arts. XII-XIII, Mex.U.S., Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922 [hereinafter Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo].
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Philippines at a price equivalent to $2.00 per resident.50 The Chinese
grants of concessions in Shanghai to the British and the French in 1860
and the sale of Hong Kong and Kowloon to the British in the 1840s
after the Opium Wars are further examples of such war settlements.51
The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were full of what one
might call contingent sales. Sovereign debtors would pledge streams of
tax revenues—tobacco, guano, alcohol, salt, and the like—to foreign
creditors.52 If the debts went unpaid and a settlement proved elusive,
the foreign creditors would try to get their governments to send troops
to take over the customs houses of the defaulting governments. These
pledges of revenues were in effect contingent sales of sovereign
control, and although many Latin American nations argued that the
manner of their enforcement—gunboat diplomacy—was illegal, they
did not challenge the underlying sale of sovereign control.
Even though outright sales of sovereign territory are no longer
common, countries continue to buy and sell some degree of sovereign
control from one another.53 Leases of land to foreign governments for
the construction and governance of military bases and embassies
involve limited cessions of sovereign authority in exchange for
remuneration.54

50. Lowell B. Bautista, The Historical Context and Legal Basis of the Philippine Treaty
Limits, 10 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 17 (2008) (citing THE FILIPINO NATION: A CONCISE
HISTORY OF THE PHILIPPINES 17 (Helen R. Tubangui et al. eds., 1982)).
51. See, e.g., Burghardt, supra note 10. Andrew Burghardt notes:
In 1815, when Austria was forced to surrender the Netherlands, she obtained Venice
and Milan as recompense; Sweden obtained Norway to compensate for her lack of
Pomerania and Finland; the Netherlands received Belgium for surrendering Ceylon,
South Africa, and Guyana to the British. In 1919 France requested control of the Saar
Basin as a reparation for the destroyed coal mines in the north of France.
Id. at 238.
52. See NORBERT GAILLARD, WHEN SOVEREIGNS GO BANKRUPT: A STUDY OF
SOVEREIGN RISK § 2.1.2 (2014); Kris Mitchener & Marc D. Weidenmier, Supersanctions and
Sovereign Debt Repayment, 29 J. INT’L MONEY & FIN. 19, 24 (2010).
53. See supra notes 11–21 and accompanying text; see also Pass the Hemlock, supra note 17,
explaining:
In an era of self-determination sales of territory have come to seem anachronistic.
But leases, involving a de facto transfer of control, are common. In 2010 Russia
extended a deal granting Finland a canal for 50 years, and gave Ukraine concessions
worth €30 billion to park its fleet at Sevastopol for 25 more years.
Id.
54. This exchange is not because embassies are the sovereign territory of the represented
state, but because international agreements typically give the premises of diplomatic missions
some immunity from local civil and criminal law. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
arts. 40–57, April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95; Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations arts. 31–39, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
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In sum, there is abundant historical precedent for the sale of
sovereign control. Explicit sales, contingent sales, and leases of
territory have been occurring between sovereigns for hundreds of
years.
The second requirement—opinio juris—is likely satisfied as well.
Treatise writers have long acknowledged the traditional rule that
countries have a nearly unbridled power to engage in cession, which is
“the transfer of sovereignty over state territory by the owner-state to
another state.”55 As Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts note, such
cessions require no approval of the affected regions:
The hardship involved for the inhabitants of the territory who remain
and lose their old citizenship and are handed over to a new sovereign
whether they like it or not, created a movement in favour of the claim
that no cession should be valid until the inhabitants had by plebiscite
given their consent to the cession . . . . But it cannot be said that
international law makes it a condition of every cession that it should
be ratified by a plebiscite.56

Holding aside the demands of good governance, then, the matter is
entirely up to the countries involved.
Contemporary scholars agree. Steven Ratner notes that “states
generally are free to agree on the disposition of disputed noncolonial
(or non-trust or -mandated) territory and its ultimate borders as they
see fit.”57 And Seokwoo Lee writes: “International law does not seem
to prescribe any specific limits on the right of a state to cede its
territory. . . . ‘All that matters is that the cession takes place with the
full ‘consent of the Governments concerned.’”58
55. OPPENHEIM, supra note 40, at 679; see R.Y. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF
TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 (1963) (defining cession as “the renunciation made by
one state in favour of another of the rights and title which the former may have to the territory in
question”). The process by which sovereign control over a region changes is also known as
succession. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 587 (3d ed. 1979)
(“[S]tate succession arises when there is a definitive replacement of one state by another in
respect of sovereignty over a given territory in conformance with international law.”); see Amos
S. Hershey, The Succession of States, 5 AM. J. INT’L L. 285, 285 (1911) (referring to a situation in
which “a state acquires a portion of the territory of another through cession or conquest” as a
“[p]artial succession”).
56. OPPENHEIM, supra note 40, at 684.
57. Ratner, supra note 1, at 811. Colonial territory is subject to the rule of uti possidetis,
though even that rule can be contracted around. Id.; see Joshua Castellino, Territorial Integrity
and the “Right” to Self-Determination: An Examination of the Conceptual Tools, 33 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 503, 549 & n.262 (2008).
58. Seokwoo Lee, Continuing Relevance of Traditional Modes of Territorial Acquisition in
International Law and a Modest Proposal, 16 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1, 10 (2000); see 1 GEORG
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B. Modern Principles: Self-Determination and Popular Control
The traditional rule thus permits governments to treat populated
regions as their property, giving the people of the impacted region no
say in cessions. We argue that this rule has lost its legitimacy, partially
because it has fallen into disuse and partially because it is incompatible
with modern principles like self-determination.
Emer de Vattel suggested as much centuries ago. Vattel accepted
that cessions of sovereignty must be permitted in some cases even
without public approval,59 but he was generally more skeptical of the
practice than some of his contemporaries (including Hugo Grotius).60
Vattel specifically rejected the idea that a nation could benefit itself by
buying and selling citizens: a nation “has not . . . a right to traffic with
their rank and liberty, on account of any advantages it may expect to
derive from such a negotiation.”61 The key factor for Vattel was that
approval for such sales must be given by the true owners of the
nation—the people: “[A]s the nation alone has a right to subject itself
to a foreign power, the right of really alienating the state can never
belong to the sovereign unless it be expressly given him by the entire
body of the people.”62
In this respect, Vattel anticipated self-determination, which is the
right of peoples and regions to choose their own national affiliations—
for example, through secession or realignment. The degree to which
self-determination and concomitant rights like secession are
mandatory rules of international law remains unclear,63 and we do not
SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS 303 (3d ed. 1957).
59. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS, Ch.
XXI, § 263 (Joseph Chitty ed., Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1867) (1758); see Stéphane
Beaulac, Vattel’s Doctrine on Territory Transfers in International Law and the Cession of
Louisiana to the United States of America, 63 LA. L. REV. 1327, 1345 (2003) (arguing that the
“only exception” to Vattel’s requirement of public consent “is in situations of pressing necessity
or danger to public safety . . . which validate the cession of territory as between the parties to such
treaties” and “[a]s for the individuals living there, they are not bound by even such a necessary
transfer unless they consent to it”).
60. VATTEL, supra note 59, at Ch. V, § 69 (“I know that many authors, and particularly
Grotius, give long enumerations of the alienations of sovereignties. But the examples often prove
only the abuse of power, not the right. And besides, the people consented to the alienation, either
willingly or by force.”).
61. Id. at Ch. XXI, § 263.
62. Id. at Ch. V, § 69.
63. See Allen Buchanan, Theories of Secession, 26 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31, 33 (1997); Hurst
Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 42 (1993). The focus here is on
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suppose that they are. But—whether out of obligation or not—many
nations have long sought local approval of territorial secession,64 and
many secessionist movements (including Scotland, Crimea, and
Catalonia in 2014) have held votes to assert that approval.
Whether or not it has achieved the status of an enforceable legal
right, it is fair to say that self-determination has grown from an abstract
aspiration to a principle recognized in foundational legal documents.65
Further, although this is a highly contested matter, many see the right
of self-determination as having evolved to include a right of remedial
secession in cases of severe oppression.66 The willingness to depart
from traditional territorial sovereignty is also reflected in the idea that
the world community has a “responsibility to protect” those people

international law, so it is not necessary to address the degree to which domestic law might forbid
secession. To some degree, as with our liability-rule scenario, we anticipate that the former will
trump the latter.
64. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 40, at 434–35, 455–57 (noting that even when territory is
obtained through prescription, it is typically ratified by plebiscite); Eyal Benvenisti, The Origins
of the Concept of Belligerent Occupation, 26 LAW & HIST. REV. 621, 628 (2008) (crediting
eighteenth-century French practice for the norm that cessions of territory between nations are
not valid unless popularly approved); Waters, supra note 19, at 20–21 (noting that although “there
is no actual obligation,” there is “precedent for the practice of consulting an affected
population”).
65. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171; Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 122 (Oct. 16) (Dillard, J.,
concurring) (“It is for the people to determine the destiny of the territory . . . .”); G.A. Res. 1541
(XV), U.N. Doc. A/Res/1541 (XV), at 29 (Dec. 15, 1960) (explaining that self-determination
could lead to secession and the formation of a new state, association of a territory with an existing
state, or integration of a territory into an already existing state); W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, THE
PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 147 (1977) (“Today, there is no
doubt that self-determination, as defined in U.N. and general international practice, is a principle
of international law which yields a right to self-government that can be claimed legitimately by
bona fide dependent peoples.”).
66. For a description of the evolution of the self-determination concept, see generally Patrick
Macklem, Self-Determination in Three Movements, in THE THEORY OF SELF-DETERMINATION
94 (Fernando R. Tesón ed., 2016). See ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELFDETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 335 (2004); LEE C.
BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 220–23 (1978); Thomas
Franck, Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession, in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 3–27 (Catherine Brölmann, René Lefeber & Marjoleine Zieck eds.,
1993). But see Donald L. Horowitz, A Right to Secede?, in NOMOS XLV: SECESSION AND SELFDETERMINATION 50, 50–51 (Stephen Macedo & Allan Buchanan eds., 2003) (questioning the
normative desirability of remedial secession); Jure Vidmar, Remedial Secession in International
Law: Theory and (Lack of) Practice, 6 ST ANTONY’S INT’L REV. 37, 37–40 (2010) (questioning
support for remedial secession).
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whose human rights are threatened.67 The underlying idea is that states
that fail to protect their own people from mass atrocities lose their right
to territorial integrity. When these atrocities occur, the global
community, with appropriate authorization from the United Nations,
can intervene.68 Indeed, the growing strength of the self-determination
right helps explain the lack of sovereign sales after World War II.
C. Filling the Gap
These two extreme positions—one giving absolute control to the
parent nation and the other giving absolute control to the dissatisfied
region—leave a gap. It has been said that “the defining issue in
international law for the twenty-first century is finding compromises
between the principles of self-determination and the sanctity of
borders.”69 How can a self-determination norm coexist with nations’
absolute power to maintain or cede regions? What about regions that
are substantially underserved by their parent nations but not quite
oppressed?
First, like Vattel, we would require regional approval for cessions.
This would mean imposing more restrictions on parent nations than
the traditional approach appears to do, but it would better satisfy the
two-part definition of CIL. As to the requirement of widespread
practice, we are not aware of any country selling a populated region in
at least a half-century.70 And as to the opinio juris requirement, the
67. See, e.g., 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 139–42 U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/1, at ### (Oct. 24, 2005); U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility To
Protect, at 4–10, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009); BUCHHEIT, supra note 66; E. Tendayi
Achiume, Syria, Cost-Sharing, and the Responsibility to Protect Refugees, 100 MINN. L. REV. 687,
712–17 (2015); Ratner, supra note 1, at 811.
68. See Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 67; see also Gareth Evans, From
Humanitarian Intervention to Responsibility to Protect, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 703, 709 (2006) (“The
starting point is that any state has a primary responsibility to protect the individuals within
it. . . . [W]here the state fails in that responsibility, through either incapacity or ill will, a secondary
responsibility to protect falls on the international community, acting primarily through the UN.”
(footnote omitted)).
69. Michael P. Scharf, Earned Sovereignty: Juridical Underpinnings, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 373, 373 (2003); see ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL
REAPPRAISAL 190 (1995); Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial
Interpretation, 16 YALE J. INT’L L. 177, 201–02 (1991).
70. See If States Traded Territory, supra note 6 (identifying the Treaty of the Danish West
Indies from 1916 as “the last time a country has directly sold control over territory to another”).
There is little understanding of how and when CIL doctrines die through nonuse. That said,
whatever the rule for CIL expiry is, the doctrine allowing sovereign sales of populated territory
would likely satisfy it. See generally Michael J. Glennon, How International Rules Die,
93 GEO. L.J. 939 (2005) (explaining how international laws “perish”); Roger Alford, The Death

BLOCHER & GULATI IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1/5/2017 12:01 PM

814

[Vol. 66:797

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

increasing acceptance of self-determination as a right and not simply
an aspiration suggests that Vattel was right.
Our second and third departures from international law—the
protection of territorial sovereignty with a liability rule in cases of illgoverned regions and the allowance of outside nations to search for
underperforming regions in other nations—do not square with
historical international practice and, therefore, traditional CIL. The
empirical evidence on how courts find CIL, however, shows that the
textbook definition is, for the most part, followed only in the breach.71
Instead—necessarily being more speculative—courts appear to employ
a kind of common law process using historical evidence to identify
customary rules that will enhance global welfare. We think our
framework would be consistent with a welfare-enhancing judicial
perspective.72
Because the threshold for remedial secession is so high,73 in
practice it seems that a region must suffer serious human rights
violations to leave.74 Our goal is to prevent these severely oppressive
scenarios from arising in the first place, by providing a mechanism that
respects territorial sovereignty while giving nations more incentive to
permit welfare-enhancing changes in sovereignty. A market for
sovereign control has the potential to do just that, because mistreated

of a Customary Rule of International Law, OPINIO JURIS (Aug. 28, 2009), http://
opiniojuris.org/2009/08/28/the-death-of-a-customary-rule-of-international-law [https://perma.cc/
4C4L-SVK7] (exploring how a practice that “has achieved the status of customary international
law cease[s] to become international law”).
71. See generally Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Customary International Law: How Do
Courts Do It?, in CUSTOM’S FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 117, 146–
47 (Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2016) (finding that international courts often ignore the textbook legal
rule in light of a pressing global need for new law); Ryan Scoville, Finding Custom, 101 IOWA L.
REV. 1893, 1899, 1935–40 (2016) (examining U.S. domestic court determinations of CIL).
72. See Flomo v. Firestone Nat’l Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1016 (7th Cir. 2011)
(“Customary international law thus resembles common law in its original sense as law arising
from custom rather than law that is formally promulgated.”); Curtis A. Bradley, Customary
International Law Adjudication as Common Law Adjudication, in CUSTOM’S FUTURE:
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 71, at 34, 50–54 (describing such an
approach); BRIAN D. LEPARD, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A NEW THEORY WITH
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 98–99 (2010) (similar).
73. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 218, ¶ 126 (Can.) (“A right to external
self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to
unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully
defined circumstances.” (emphasis omitted)); William W. Burke-White, Crimea and the
International Legal Order, (Penn Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series,
Paper No. 14-24, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2474084 [https://perma.cc/L3UG-9XCB].
74. See Burghardt, supra note 10, at 232.
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regions wanting to leave a country could in effect buy their way out of
a bad situation. If the people of region X would rather live in Country
B than Country A, they could bid—rather than fight—for their
freedom. If Country B supports the move, perhaps because of
historical or ethnic kinship with the residents of X, then it can facilitate
the move by adding consideration to the bid.
This approach represents a better negotiation of the conflicting
principles of territorial integrity and self-determination. In our system,
misbehaving-but-not-oppressive countries will be entitled to
compensation for a loss of sovereign territory. On the flip side, the
people living in that territory will have self-determination but must pay
for it. Our proposal delivers neither full territorial integrity nor an
unencumbered right of self-determination. But it does accommodate
both of those conflicting principles.
The transactions we have in mind will not be feasible in every
secession dispute. Given the politically and emotionally fraught
scenarios that lead to such disputes, there will often be gaps between
asking and offer prices. Countries may be unwilling to give up territory
they consider to be part of their identity; people may be unwilling to
pay for something that they think is their right.
In such situations, outside funding might be available. After all,
violent secessions are costly to the international community in terms of
money spent and lives lost.75 Rather than pay for military intervention
or nation rebuilding, international organizations might prefer to
facilitate border-changing treaties by simply buying out a nation’s
claim. Similarly, a neighboring nation—perhaps the one that the region
wishes to join—might top up the territory’s bid with funds of its own.
II. THE FRAMEWORK
A. Starting Points
We base our proposal on a few principles distilled from the
foregoing discussion of borders and international law.

75. Development aid in 2013 was approximately $138.4 billion. OECD, AID TO
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES REBOUNDS IN 2013 TO REACH AN ALL-TIME HIGH 1
(2014), http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/aid-to-developing-countries-rebounds-in-2013-to-reachan-all-time-high.htm [https://perma.cc/K44G-UK6F]. Roughly a quarter-million troops were
involved in peacekeeping operations. See Jane Dundon, Global Trends in Peacekeeping
Operations, in STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, SIPRI YEARBOOK
2013, at 61, 63 (2013) (reporting approximately 233,000 troops deployed in 2012).
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1. The Problem of Borders.
•

There are nations and regions whose people would be
better off with different national affiliations.

•

Nations tend to resist border changes because they do not
want to allow their regions to become independent or to
affiliate with another nation.

•

This resistance, and the lack of incentives or mechanisms to
overcome it, is the main obstacle to welfare-enhancing
border changes.

•

When changes do occur—usually because of violent
secession or outside intervention—the rules are unclear
with regard to what compensation the former parent nation
should receive for matters such as national debt, past
investments, and lost natural resources.

2. Legal Background.
•

Traditional international law permits nations to cede
regions without the approval of the region’s residents.76

•

If people living within a region are severely oppressed,
however, they might have a right to remedial secession—to
exit with no penalty.77

•

These two options correspond with two contradictory
principles of international law: territorial integrity for the
sovereign and self-determination for the “peoples.”78

B. The “Market” Mechanism
Our goal is to design a mechanism that allows for welfareenhancing transfers of regions in a fashion that generally satisfies the
primary constraints of international law (the principles of selfdetermination and territorial integrity) while giving parent countries
more incentive to either govern their regions well or permit them to
exit. We explore that system in market terms, and we contemplate and

76. See supra Part I.A.
77. See supra Part I.B.
78. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, para. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (“All peoples have the right of self-determination.”); International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 1, para. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (same).
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describe possible financial transactions, but these are a means rather
than an end. The goal is to improve governance, subject to the starting
points noted above and—as much as possible—the international law
described below. Changes to the international legal system are
required, but they are in the nature of filling gaps in the system rather
than rebuilding it.79
1. Who Must Agree. The relevant parties are the impacted region,
the acquiring nation or nations, and the parent nation. In this system,
the region and acquiring nation would have to assent to any change.
The parent nation’s power to veto a change would depend on its
governance of the region.
a. The People of the Impacted Region. Consistent with the
principle of self-determination, the population of a region would have
the right to vote on whether to solicit, accept, or refuse governance bids
from other nations.80 The parent nation would have to refrain from
blocking or otherwise interfering with the vote,81 and the vote would
take place under internationally determined standards with external
monitors.82
b. The Acquiring Nation. Nations wanting to exert sovereign
control over a particular region could propose compensation to the
people of the region for their approval and to the parent nation for its
consent. The existing parent nation could also make a bid (to get the
region to stay), as could the disaffected region (if it wanted
independence).83 Such compensation could take a range of forms, from
79. Nations can, in theory, get together and formulate a treaty to govern border changes.
Our goal is to see what can be done within the existing system.
80. For uninhabited territories, this step would be irrelevant—the negotiation would simply
proceed between the nations involved.
81. Many countries forbid such votes, and even discussion of them. See, e.g., China Uighur
Scholar Ilham Tohti on Separatism Charges, BBC NEWS (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-asia-china-26333583 [https://perma.cc/TXE3-S4KF]; Raphael Minder, Catalonia to
Defy Court with Independence Straw Poll, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/11/05/world/europe/defying-court-ruling-catalonia-to-press-ahead-with-independencestraw-poll.html [https://perma.cc/92MR-TF53].
82. The use of international monitors for elections has been extensive and increasing over
the past half-century and both NGOs and the United Nations have developed procedures and
criteria for how monitoring should be done. For a discussion of these mechanisms, including their
problems, see generally JUDITH G. KELLEY, MONITORING DEMOCRACY: WHEN
INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION WORKS, AND WHY IT OFTEN FAILS (2012).
83. Our proposal would not guarantee international recognition of the new state. See
Christian Hillgruber, The Admission of New States to the International Community, 9 EUR. J.
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lump-sum financial transfers to land swaps to military and political
obligations.84 The only required element of the offer would be the
option of citizenship for the people of the acquired territory.85
c. The Parent Nation. The power of parent nations to block
realignment of their regions presents a thorny problem. Under the
current system, there are two possibilities. At one extreme, parent
nations have full and complete rights to transfer regions—population
included—to other sovereigns or simply to give up sovereignty and
abandon the population altogether.86 At the other extreme, parent
nations that severely oppress their regions can theoretically lose their
right to control or be compensated for the loss of the region (the
principle of remedial secession). Whether a nation can block the
secession or realignment of a region, therefore, depends on how well
the nation treats that region, which the current system treats as a binary
question that depends on the existence of significant oppression. Our
proposal incorporates these two existing options and offers a third.
2. Three Approaches to Price Setting. Our mechanism allocates the
price-setting power to three different parties, depending on how well a
region is governed: to the parent nation and region in cases of good
governance, to the region itself in cases of outright oppression or
genocide, or to the global community (with a right of review through a
court like the ICJ87) in cases of governance that denies representation

INT’L L. 491, 499 (1998) (“The reliability of the new entity as a partner in international relations
is the decisive criterion of statehood in the sense of international law.”). But the kind of sale
described here would, most likely, result in recognition by the parent state, which would facilitate
broader recognition. See id. at 504–05.
84. STRAUSS, supra note 11, at 104–07 (describing different forms of compensation for leases
between countries).
85. This requirement would help prevent the risk of colonial-style oppression. Versions of
the principle have appeared in international law and practice. See, e.g., Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness art. 10, Aug. 3, 1961, 989 U.N.T.S. 175 (“Every treaty . . . providing for
the transfer of territory shall include provisions designed to secure that no person shall become
stateless . . . . In the absence of such provisions a Contracting State . . . shall confer its nationality
on [otherwise stateless] persons . . . .”); Peter J. Spiro, A New International Law of Citizenship,
105 AM. J. INT’L L. 694, 721–22 (2011) (discussing a similar problem in the context of state
succession).
86. See supra Part II.B.
87. The ICJ is a possibility, not a perfect solution. See David Sloss, Using International Court
of Justice Advisory Opinions to Adjudicate Secessionist Claims, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 357,
389 (2002) (recognizing limitations and arguing that “the I.C.J. advisory opinion mechanism is an
under-utilized tool that may be helpful in promoting political settlement of some secessionist
disputes”).
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or equal rights. These three approaches correspond with notions of the
parent nation’s territorial sovereignty as dispositive, irrelevant, or
important. Keeping with current international law, the choice between
these options—the degree to which territorial sovereignty must be
respected—depends on how well the parent nation treats the region.
a. Category 1: Set by Parent (Property Rule in Parent). If the
parent nation provides representation and equal treatment to the
people of a region, the only valid transaction is one in which the parent
nation, region, and purchasing nation all agree on a price. The parent
nation’s interest is generally protected by a property rule, and it can
veto any proposed transfer. Whereas the traditional approach would
permit nations to unilaterally approve a transfer, the rule must take
into account the modern right of self-determination, meaning that the
region must also approve any transfer—something that many have
advocated and which many nations already do in practice.88
b. Category 2: Set by Region (Property Rule in Region). In cases
of extreme oppression, a parent nation forfeits its ability to say no to a
region’s departure. This is remedial secession; it transfers sovereign
control to the region itself. Absent ex post negotiation, the parent
nation receives no compensation for its prior investments in local
natural resources, the region’s share of the national debt, and so on.
c. Category 3: Set by the World Community (Liability Rule in
Parent—the Purchased Secession or Realignment). The gulf between
the preceding options is wide. What interests us are those cases that fall
between these two extremes, in the range of what one might call
medium oppression—where a government has denied representation
or equal treatment to the peoples of a region, but has not crossed the
line into extreme oppression. The Supreme Court of Canada
acknowledged this category in its opinion on the possible secession of
Quebec:

88. If flipped around, this principle rules out the possibility of forced secession or expulsion.
The expulsion question, as the debates over Grexit illustrate, is complicated. We explore this
question in Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Forced Secessions, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
(forthcoming 2017) [hereinafter Blocher & Gulati, Forced Secessions] and Joseph Blocher, Mitu
Gulati & Laurence R. Helfer, Can Greece be Expelled from the Eurozone? Toward a Default Rule
on Expulsion from International Organizations, in FILLING THE GAPS IN GOVERNANCE: THE
CASE OF EUROPE 127 (Franklin Allen et al. eds., 2016).
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[T]he international law right to self-determination only generates, at
best, a right to external self-determination in situations of former
colonies; where a people is oppressed, as for example under foreign
military occupation; or where a definable group is denied meaningful
access to government to pursue their political, economic, social and
cultural development. In all three situations, the people in question
are entitled to a right to external self-determination because they
have been denied the ability to exert internally their right to selfdetermination.89

The court found that Quebec did not fall into the third category, but it
is easy to imagine situations that do.90
In these in-between cases the parent nation’s sovereign control
should be protected by a liability rule rather than a property rule.91 This
would permit regions to exit—at a market price, subject to review by a
third party—when they have been denied representation or equal
treatment, even if they have not been subject to extreme oppression.
Though the application of a liability rule in this context would be
novel, the concept is not. Law often recognizes entitlements as
legitimate while denying the holder of the entitlement the power to set
the price.92 Such rules are typically preferred when transaction costs
and holdout problems present obstacles to bargaining, or when, for

89. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 218, ¶ 138 (Can.) (emphasis added);
see id. at ¶¶ 128–35. Similar language is also found in the concurring opinion of Judges Wildhaber
and Ryssdal in a 1996 case from the European Court of Human Rights:
In recent years a consensus has seemed to emerge that peoples may also exercise a right
to self-determination if their human rights are consistently and flagrantly violated or if
they are without representation at all or are massively under-represented in an
undemocratic and discriminatory way. If this description is correct, then the right to
self-determination is a tool which may be used to re-establish international standards
of human rights and democracy.
Loizidou v. Turkey, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 513, 535 (1996) (Wildhaber, J., concurring, joined by
Ryssdal, J.); cf. Milena Sterio, On the Right to External Self-Determination: “Selfistans,” Secession,
and the Great Powers’ Rule, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 137, 137−39 (2010) (discussing criteria used by
the international community to validate a group’s self-determination efforts).
90. The ongoing Ukraine–Crimea–Russia conflict seems a plausible candidate. Joseph
Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Ukraine and Russia—You Break It, You Bought It, ERIC POSNER BLOG
(Feb. 4, 2015), http://ericposner.com/guest-post-ukraine-and-russia-you-break-it-you-bought-it
[https://perma.cc/FSS5-QVEN].
91. The other possibility would be to vest the entitlement in the region and protect it with a
liability rule. This possibility means that a poorly governed region could be forced to stay but
would be entitled to compensation determined by a third party. We have vested the liability rule
in the parent rather than the region partly because territorial sovereignty is the current default
rule, and because our requirement of regional approval for any cession protects the right of selfdetermination.
92. See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 24 (discussing liability rules).
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other reasons, the holder of an entitlement should not be able to say
no but should receive some compensation.93 Many of these same
reasons—including transaction costs and bargaining breakdowns—
support use of a liability rule to protect parent nations’ sovereign
control in cases of regional oppression.
As a practical matter, the challenge is to define what kind of
oppression is sufficient to trigger the liability rule. One possibility is to
peg the trigger to a threshold already found in international law. The
Vienna Declaration suggests that the guarantee of territorial
sovereignty extends only to “states conducting themselves in
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples and thus possessed of a Government representing the whole
people belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind.”94
Breach of those principles might be shown by flouting of CIL rules,
U.N. resolutions, and the like. This liability rule would cover the states
that fail this threshold—for example, by denying equal protection or
representativeness95—by giving their regions a right to leave at a price
set by an auction. If the parent nation rejected this market-determined
price, it could seek review with some international body such as the
ICJ.
For example, if it were true that Ukraine’s corrupt government
had discriminated against Ukrainians of Russian descent and that the
people of Crimea genuinely wished to become part of Russia,96 then it
93. The prototypical example is of homeowners facing pollution from a socially valuable
industry. Sometimes law will require damages to compensate them for their harm, but not give
them an injunction to block the activity. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870,
872 (N.Y. 1970).
94. World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, ¶ 2,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/23 (June 25, 1993); see also G.A. Res. 50/6, preface (Oct. 24, 1995)
(recognizing the “right of peoples . . . to realize their inalienable right of self-determination,”
which “shall not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action that would dismember or
impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent
states conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples”).
95. We adopt this standard because we want to hew as closely as possible to existing
international law, but there are of course many other ways to define “bad” governments: those
whose people are poor or dissatisfied, for example. Nations respecting our two requirements—
equal protection and representativeness—will be subject to domestic political pressure with
regard to these shortcomings, and so will hopefully address them to the degree possible. Outright
oppressive regimes fall into the second category, and thereby lose the power to forbid exit.
96. See Anton Moiseienko, What Do Russian Lawyers Say About Crimea?, OPINIO JURIS
(Sept. 24, 2014, 9:51 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/09/24/guest-post-russian-lawyers-say-crimea
[https://perma.cc/QJD3-VZST]; Valerie Pacer, Vladimir Putin’s Justification for Russian Action
in Crimea Undermines His Previous Arguments Over Syria, Libya and Iraq, LONDON SCH. ECON.
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seems more legitimate to say that Russia could acquire it at a price. In
practice, this would probably mean offsetting some of Ukraine’s
existing debt to Russia.97 (If this sounds too friendly to Russia, consider
the fact that, as things now stand, Ukraine has lost Crimea and received
nothing in return.)
This would mean vesting an international body—probably the
ICJ—with the power to determine when the liability rule has been
triggered, and also the power to review challenges to the compensation
that is provided to the parent nation in the case of a regional exit. This
raises difficult questions of institutional design and authority that this
Article does not attempt to answer.
3. Best Practices. The foregoing is an outline of elements that
should be required for any transaction in the market for sovereign
control. But as with any market, there are other rules and principles
that might be desirable even if not required:
•

Require giving the people of a transacted territory the
option of retaining their current citizenship;98

•

Require supermajority approval of the transferred region
and a simple-majority vote of the parent nation, reflecting
the comparative weight of the interests at stake;

•

Set standards or prerequisites for when regional votes must
be permitted. Given the costs and the low likelihood that
the vote will be in the affirmative, the option to hold a
regional exit vote should be held at larger intervals of time
than typical local elections—maybe every twenty-five
years;99

•

Require parent nations to publicize all offers of
compensation;

& POL. SCI.: EUROPP (Mar. 11, 2014), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/03/11/vladimirputins-justification-for-russian-action-in-crimea-undermines-his-previous-arguments-over-syrialibya-and-iraq [https://perma.cc/3S4L-882T].
97. See generally Blocher & Gulati, supra note 90 (arguing that Ukraine should claim that it
is entitled to set off debt to Russia for having taken large portions of its country).
98. SHAUL ARIELI, DOUBI SCHWARTZ & HADAS TAGARI, INJUSTICE AND FOLLY: ON THE
PROPOSALS TO CEDE ARAB LOCALITIES FROM ISRAEL TO PALESTINE 75 (2006) (describing this
as the current custom).
99. Democratic principles demand that incumbent political parties must stand for election
every so often: Why not hold the state itself to a roughly analogous standard?
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•

Encourage compensation in the form of dedicated revenue
streams, providing some nexus between the form of
compensation and the purchased territory;100

•

Forbid sales except when all involved countries have
sufficiently democratic governments and institutions.

823

Any or all of these practices might be desirable, but for now, the
goal is simply to identify the minimum requirements for legitimacy.
Figure 1. Elements of the Framework*
Category 1

Category 2

Category 3

State of
Governance

Good (Strong
Default Rule)

Oppressive or
Genocidal

Denies
Representation or
Equal Rights

Who “Owns”
Sovereignty

Parent Nation

Region

Parent Nation

Who Must
Approve

Parent Nation and
Region

Region

Region

Who Sets Price

Parent Nation and
Region

Region

1. Auction; 2. ICJ
(if Price Disputed)

Corresponding
Legal Principle

Territorial
Sovereignty

SelfDetermination or
Remedial
Secession

Combination of
Territorial
Sovereignty and
Self-Determination

Possible Example

United Kingdom
and Scotland

Indonesia and East Ukraine and
Timor
Crimea (Arguably)

* Italicized portions represent changes to the current system.

III. THE FOUR HORSEMEN
Though we have tried to show that our proposal is largely
consistent with existing international law and practice, the framework

100. For example, if a Hindu country were to purchase a Hindu region from a Muslim country
to save its residents from religious strife, the purchaser might offer to build a mosque for the
parent nation instead of simply writing a check. This approach might make the offer more
politically palatable to the seller and make it easier to determine whether the buyer has performed
its obligations.
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is nontraditional to say the least, and we have benefitted from
extensive discussions, feedback, and criticism. We call the following
categories of objections the “four horsemen” to capture the tone of the
most strident critics.
A. War
Stable boundaries help prevent conflict. Competition for sovereign
control has led to global catastrophe twice in the last century and to
countless smaller conflicts and wars. The diagnosis is correct—some
boundaries are “wrong”—but the proposed remedy kills the patient. If
you want to do something for peace, put this Article into a desk drawer
and never speak of it again.

International law strongly favors stable borders101 on the premise
that they will discourage violent conflict.102 This supposition is reflected
in doctrines like uti possidetis, which freezes the borders of newly
independent states based on boundaries drawn by colonial
administrators103 even when those borders seem to conflict with
principles of self-determination.104
The premise is debatable.105 Despite the stability norm, borders
are frequently disputed both internally106 and externally.107 And
borders can and do change peacefully—consider the “velvet divorce,”

101. See, e.g., JENNINGS, supra note 55, at 70 (“[T]he bias of the existing law is towards
stability . . . . This is right, for the stability of territorial boundaries must always be the ultimate
aim.”); Stuart Elden, Contingent Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity and the Sanctity of Borders, 26
SAIS REV. INT’L AFF. 11, 11 (2006) (identifying “territorial preservation of existing boundaries”
as a central tenet of the international political system).
102. Paulsson, supra note 35, at 122. The doctrine of uti possidetis is often defended or
explained on these grounds. See, e.g., Org. of African Unity [OAU], Border Disputes Among
African States, at 1, OAU Doc. AHG/Res. 16(I) (July 21, 1964).
103. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso/Mali), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 554, ¶ 20 (Dec. 22); Elden,
supra note 101, at 12.
104. Cf. Frontier Dispute, 1986 I.C.J. at ¶ 26 (recognizing the conflict between uti possidetis
and self-determination, and concluding that maintenance of the status quo was “the wisest
course” so as to “prevent the stability of new states being endangered by fratricidal struggles”).
105. JOHN AGNEW, GEOPOLITICS: RE-VISIONING WORLD POLITICS 102 (Derek Gregory &
Linda McDowell eds., 1998) (noting the costs of maintaining colonial boundaries).
106. Aman Mahray McHugh, Comment, Resolving International Boundary Disputes in
Africa: A Case for the International Court of Justice, 49 HOW. L.J. 209, 218 & n.73 (2005).
107. Paulsson, supra note 35, at 123 (noting that 129 of such conflicts occurred between 1950
and 1990, covering “roughly one-third of the then existing land boundaries” (citing PAUL K.
HUTH, STANDING YOUR GROUND: TERRITORIAL DISPUTES AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
(1996))); see also Burghardt, supra note 10, at 226 (discussing examples of external disputes).
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which divided Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia.108
But assuming for the sake of argument that stability does lessen
violence both at the domestic level (by reducing potentially explosive
struggles) and the international level (by discouraging interference
with other nations’ affairs),109 the question is whether this new
framework could do better.
1. Preventing Incipient Conflicts. First, consider the likelihood of
incipient armed conflict in the case of disaffected regions. Violence is
likely to be a function of at least three factors: the degree of unrest in
the region, the parent nation’s toleration of dissent, and the willingness
of other nations to intervene.110
a. Degree of Regional Unrest. Under the current system, as in ours,
regions with low levels of unhappiness are unlikely to give rise to
violence. In the current system, such regions are likely to accept their
lot; in our system, they might explore the possibility of a change in
sovereign control but are unlikely to push for it.
When a region is deeply unhappy, however, armed conflict is more
likely. In the current system, the residents of such a region might try to
fight their way out of the parent country, or to increase the cost of
affiliation to a level that the nation is unwilling to bear. The residents
might even seek military support from other nations. The result is a
powder keg.
Under our proposal, the incentives are different. The availability
of a market solution gives the region an exit option it did not have
before—a means by which to leave a volatile situation. Violent conduct
will be counterproductive because secessionist movements will want to
demonstrate to other nations that they could thrive with a new
affiliation, not that they are unstable.
b. Toleration of Dissent. In nations that tolerate dissent and are
unwilling to constrain secessionist movements by force—for example,
108. But see Noel Maurer, Slovakia and Scotland, POWER AND THE MONEY (Sept. 17,
2014, 2:36 PM), http://noelmaurer.typepad.com/aab/2014/09/slovakia-and-scotland.html [https://
perma.cc/KUV9-44NX] (arguing that the divorce neither reflected popular opinion nor delivered
benefits).
109. For an example of an argument along these lines, see Donald L. Horowitz, The Cracked
Foundations of the Right to Secede, 14 J. DEMOCRACY 3, 9−11 (2003).
110. There is a vast literature on the causes of war, and we do not mean to suggest that this
framework is the only way to think about the issue. See generally JACK S. LEVY & WILLIAM R.
THOMPSON, CAUSES OF WAR (2010).
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the United Kingdom with Scotland in 2014—there is little risk of
regional disaffection causing war. Decisions will be made peacefully
under both the current system and the proposed alternative.
But when nations do not tolerate dissent, the market for sovereign
control is likely to outperform the present system. Under the current
system, nations can and do use their police powers to ensure domestic
law and order or protect their territorial integrity. So long as they do
not go too far—and the threshold is high—they can use these powers
to quash dissent. Our proposal would reduce the incentives for doing
so and would give the parent nation an incentive to find a better match
for its unhappy partner, particularly because fraught regional
affiliations are costly.
c. Outside Intervention. Under the current system, a foreign
government that would obtain a high benefit from secession might be
willing to provide support to people of the disaffected region. Such
investment can fuel the fire of domestic conflict. Under the current
system, secessionist movements have a perverse incentive to escalate
the conflict so as to justify outside intervention. Under our proposal, a
foreign government that supports a disaffected region could pay the
existing parent nation to allow the secession, rather than use its
resources to escalate whatever nascent conflict might exist.111
For all three factors, then, our framework would likely prevent
armed conflict better than the current system. To be sure, this proposal
would bring back an element of competition for territory, which carries
risks. However, managed through a market for sovereign territory,
such competition could not only improve domestic political
responsiveness by giving nations more incentive to treat their people
well, but could lessen the risk of international conflict by increasing
economic interdependence.
The winners of the competition in a market for sovereign control
will not be, as in the past, the nations that have the most powerful
militaries. The winners will be the nations that can best provide citizens
of the various dissatisfied regions with an expectation of future
flourishing and pay the parent nation compensation for the acquisition

111. The marginal cost of a financial bid might be higher than that of military action, at least
when the military itself is already equipped and ready to fight. Indeed, as a domestic political
matter there may be benefits to military posturing or skirmishing. We cannot fix that problem, but
we do not worsen it either.
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of the new territory. Escalating conflict will make it harder, not easier,
to prevail in this regard.
A market for sovereign control would reduce the incentives for
potentially violent outside interference by would-be acquirers. The
acquiring nation needs the approval of the populace of the territory. It
therefore has an incentive to persuade the populace of the benefits that
it can provide as compared to those that might be provided by other
suitors, including the parent nation. An outside nation, if it does stir up
local support for secession, will not necessarily reap the benefits of its
misbehavior. It might succeed in breaking up the existing relationship
only to lose out to another suitor.
We might be wrong: perhaps the introduction of a market for
sovereign control will incentivize or provide a smokescreen for bad
behavior. A parent country might further mistreat a dissatisfied region
to force it to accept a sale.112 A dissatisfied region might make things
hard on its parent country for the same reason. Similarly, would-be
acquiring nations might try to destabilize a nation or its regions to
create the possibility of a sale. Neither current international law nor
this proposal can prevent such destabilization. But the market would
create desirable alternatives. Instead of spending resources on an
invasion and dealing with sanctions and rebellions, nations would be
incentivized to use their resources to make an attractive offer.
One might also argue that the most serious risk of violence comes
not from outside nations that want a transaction, but from those hoping
to stop one. In most cases we would expect that sales of sovereign
territory will enhance the welfare of neighboring nations because
improvements to a neighbor’s economic circumstances tend to create
positive externalities. But there will be costs, because neighboring
nations may have to alter their defense plans and economic policies to
deal with changes in their neighbor’s national identity. A market for
sovereign control would provide a mechanism by which to take these
interests into account: third parties could participate economically—
for example, by adding funds to a territory’s bid for independence.113
Finally, the introduction of a liability rule could theoretically lead
to violence—for example, if a parent nation refused to accept a
purchased secession or realignment. We cannot rule this out—it is the

112. If the nation went too far, however, it might trigger remedial secession and therefore lose
the region entirely with no possibility of compensation.
113. Cf. Ratner, supra note 1, at 823 (“[T]he international law on territory points toward
substantive solutions during negotiations, whether offered by the parties or by outsiders.”).
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same problem that arises in the context of remedial secession and selfdetermination. But the net benefits would likely be positive. The
region’s exit might prevent a civil war after all. Although the parent
nation would not have a right to say no, it would receive compensation,
which should limit its interest in going to war.
2. Resolving Existing Disputes. A second set of cases consists of
situations when two or more nations have laid claim to the same piece
of sovereign territory and the dispute has already begun. Such disputes
are common,114 and while some seem harmlessly absurd,115 others
exacerbate underlying tensions116 or escalate into violence.117
Despite some successes, existing international law and legal
institutions have struggled to resolve conflicts over sovereign
territory.118 The result is that “[t]erritorial negotiations seem
dominated by power, politics, bargaining and compromise;

114. See supra note 107.
115. Machias Seal Island is roughly equidistant from New Brunswick and Maine, and is the
subject of a sovereignty dispute between Canada and the United States. Stephen R. Kelley, Good
Neighbors, Bad Border, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2012, at A31. Canada’s Department of Foreign
Affairs maintains a lighthouse on the island “for sovereignty purposes,” and pays for two
Canadians (the island’s only inhabitants, besides seals and puffins of indeterminate nationality)
to stand watch in month-long shifts. Id.
For decades now, “Denmark and Canada have clashed over their competing claims to a
small, uninhabitable rock known as Hans Island.” Christopher Stevenson, Hans Off!: The Struggle
for Hans Island and the Potential Ramifications for International Border Dispute Resolution, 30
B.C. INT’L. & COMP. L. REV. 263, 263 (2007). It has now become a tradition for Danish visitors to
leave a bottle of aquavit on the island. Canadians retaliate with bottles of Canadian whisky. Id. at
267 & n.30. Ratner points to similar actions, for similar reasons, in the Spratly Islands. Ratner,
supra note 1, at 820 (“The results are the displays of Chinese, Taiwanese, Filipino, Vietnamese,
Bruneian, and Malaysian authority in the islands, to the point of planting flags and hapless sailors
on uninhabitable rocks.”).
116. How Uninhabited Islands Soured China-Japan Ties, BBC NEWS: ASIA (Nov. 10, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11341139 [https://perma.cc/D87T-K4QM]. On the
role of law in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, see Chi Manjiao, The Unhelpfulness of Treaty
Law in Solving the Sino-Japan Sovereign Dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, 6 E. ASIA L. REV. 163,
164 (2011).
117. Paul R. Hensel, Charting a Course to Conflict: Territorial Issues and Interstate Conflict
1816–1992, in A ROAD MAP TO WAR: TERRITORIAL DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT 115, 130−32 (Paul F. Diehl ed., 1999) (arguing that territorial disputes are more likely
to lead to violent conflict than other kinds of international disputes).
118. See Todd L. Allee & Paul K. Huth, Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International Legal
Rulings as Domestic Political Cover, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 219, 220−21, 229 (2006) (showing
that of 348 territorial disputes from 1919 to 1995, thirty resulted in pursuit of judicial or arbitral
solution); Ratner, supra note 1, at 821 (“The absence of compulsory jurisdiction outside Article
36(2) of the ICJ Statute and compromissory clauses in treaties means that only in rare cases does
the law require two sides to face an adjudication of their border dispute.”).
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determining the role for law in this process has seemed almost
impossible.”119 The ultimate resolution of the dispute in the South
China Sea will be an important test—a tribunal in the Hague recently
issued a rebuke to China, which in turn responded that the decision
“[was] invalid and ha[d] no binding force” and that “China d[id] not
accept or recognize it.”120
A market for sovereign control could facilitate settlement by
permitting countries to buy out each other’s claims. Parties can, after
all, negotiate even when entitlements are unclear or disputed, just as
they do in other kinds of settlement.121 These resolutions, once
entrenched in treaties, would outrank other factors like uti possidetis
and inherited title.122
Our framework would not be a perfect solution to international
disputes. Countries will undoubtedly continue to pursue armed
conflict, for reasons of national pride, overconfidence, leaders’ narrow
interests, failure to predict costs, and so on.123 But the market
alternative provides one more possibility for avoiding war, and there is
some reason to think that it could succeed. Simply bringing the parties
to the table to talk about a transaction might get them to focus on one
another’s interests and thereby help avoid bloodshed.124 Purchase will
often be cheaper than war, and the international community might
prefer to help fund a purchase rather than a military intervention or a

119. Ratner, supra note 1, at 808.
120. Jane Perlez, Panel Rejects China’s Claims in Sea Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2016, at
A1.
121. See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4, 6–30 (1984) (presenting a model in which “the determinants
of settlement and litigation are solely economic, including the expected costs to parties of
favorable or adverse decisions, the information that parties possess about the likelihood of success
at trial, and the direct costs of litigation and settlement”).
122. Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), Judgment, 1994 I.C.J. 6, ¶ 73 (Feb. 3) (declining to
consider arguments based on uti possidetis, inherited title, or spheres of influence because the
disputed borders were defined by treaty); Castellino, supra note 57, at 566 (“The law as it stands
suggests that uti possidetis juris lines may be modified by consent.”); Brian Taylor Sumner, Note,
Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice, 53 DUKE L.J. 1779, 1804 (2004).
123. See Paulsson, supra note 35, at 124. Jan Paulsson explains:
Not all boundary disputes can be reduced to an economic equation. States may contest
territory that has no resource value but that has emotional significance or strategic
military value. For example, there seem to have been few resources at stake in the
dispute between Argentina and Chile in the Lagunda del Desierto arbitration.
Id.
124. See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN (Bruce Patton ed., 1981) (describing the benefits of interest-based
negotiation in international disputes).
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postconflict nation-building effort. Even in volatile or war-torn areas,
sales can sometimes provide a peaceful solution. Notably, Egypt and
Israel were able to resolve their dispute over the Taba hotel strip—held
by Israel following the 1967 and 1973 wars—through arbitration125 and
negotiated purchase.126
B. Colonialism
Trading sovereignty will lead to colonialism—rich countries, as they
did a century ago, will use manipulative and coercive techniques to take
over the poorest nations, just as surely as if they had invaded with
armies. History shows that countries will leverage economic power into
political power. Your proposal will produce a new era of imperialism.

The colonialism objection to our proposal comes in at least three
forms. The first is that countries and regions, perhaps because of
coercion, will assent to undesirable proposals. Second, to the degree
that transfers of sovereign control import or rely on domestic rules—
in defining what counts as consent, for example—introduction of a
market could exacerbate existing problems by allowing nations to
effectively sell out their regions. Third, within the liability framework,
the diminishment of territorial sovereignty would give the ICJ, or
another international body, power that might be used to disfavor
certain nations.
One response to each of these objections would be to limit
transfers only to regions and countries that meet certain prerequisites:
high levels of education and civic involvement, for example, or strong
democratic institutions. This restriction would eliminate the liabilityrule transfers and lessen concerns about nations selling citizens without
their informed consent while preserving an important role for the
market in the cases like Scotland, Quebec, and Catalonia.
But it would be a pity to deny benefits to the regions that need
them most. There are three reasons not to fear that this market would
devolve into an imperialist project. First, any time a territory is
transferred from one country to another, its residents must be given
citizenship in the new country. Second, the residents must approve any

125. Boundary Dispute Concerning the Taba Area (Egypt-Isr. Arb. Trib. 1988), 27 I.L.M.
1421 (1988).
126. Alan Cowell, Israel Gives Disputed Resort to Egypt, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 1989), http://
www.nytimes.com/1989/03/16/world/israel-gives-disputed-resort-to-egypt.html [https://perma.cc/
4K72-TNS7] (“Egypt paid $37 million for the hotel and agreed to allow easy Israeli access to it in
negotiations that resolved the last obstacles to the return.”).
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such transfer; thus, they have the right to refuse. Third, bad choices
about borders will not be set in stone; the mechanism makes it easier
to reverse them.
The citizenship requirement puts pressure on the acquiring nation
to share its resources with its new residents and respond to their
concerns, consistent with domestic laws.127 Under colonialism, the
reverse was true: conquering nations extracted resources from their
colonies and the colonies’ people while denying them citizenship and
therefore preventing political or other repercussions.
Because it raises the cost of an acquisition, the full-citizenship
requirement should deter rich nations who might otherwise rush out to
purchase sovereign control over poor regions.128 One need only
consider the lack of enthusiasm that rich nations have for immigration
from impoverished nations. Indeed, critics of our proposal might
suggest that its flaw would not be a lack of supply, but of demand.129
The second protection against colonialism is the right of
transacted territories to say no. Unlike colonialism, the acquisition of
territory will be made not by force, but by consent. Here, dissatisfied
regions will choose which outside nations can best help them thrive.
That reverses the traditional pattern of colonialism. If there are
concerns about misinformed, coerced, or fraudulent voting,
international monitors and institutions can step in.130
Historically, such fraud has been a problem. In many cases,
territory was acquired “using unequal and even fraudulent treaties—
subjugation, and, in some instances, quasi-prescription claims.”131 But
international law has come a long way. Coercive agreements are
voidable. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties identifies

127. We do not assume that countries necessarily treat their citizens equally in all respects—
most nations, including the United States, do not. See Juan R. Torruella, The Insular Cases: The
Establishment of a Regime of Political Apartheid, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 283, 345 (2007). But we
assume that most countries treat citizens better than noncitizens.
128. See Should the U.S. Merge with Mexico?, FREAKONOMICS (Nov. 6, 2014,
9:55 AM), http://freakonomics.com/2014/11/06/should-the-u-s-merge-with-mexico-full-transcript
[https://perma.cc/9VH3-AK65] (quoting Austan Goolsbee on the possibility of a U.S.–Mexico
merger: “[G]iven the fiscal set up of the US, if you’re going to add 60 million people who make
less than $5,000 a year, under our current system, you’re going to have massive transfer payments
and subsidies from what are now the United States to the new states . . . formerly of Mexico”).
129. See infra Part III.D.
130. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) is just one prominent example of an institution that
already does this kind of work.
131. Castellino, supra note 57, at 529.
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coercion and threat or use of force “in violation of the principles of
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations” as a
basis for voiding a treaty.132 The same principles would void a coercive
treaty of cession.133
Critics might not be satisfied with these two protections against
colonial domination. Perhaps we put too much faith in international
law and institutions. The liability-rule regime in particular would
empower the ICJ (or something like it) to make determinations about
which countries have governed their regions well enough to retain
them. Perhaps the ICJ will disfavor poor, weak, or non-Western
governments, thereby becoming a roving colonialism commission—
determining which regions can be purchased and for how much.
But this scenario is unlikely. Problems of definition and
enforcement have always plagued international law, but the market for
sovereign control would be no more susceptible to them than other
foundational projects, including international human rights law. We
have not precisely defined the threshold for the liability rule, but
neither has international law defined the standard of oppression
needed for remedial secession.134 And not trying at all means letting
underserved regions continue to suffer in the legacy of colonialism: a
high price to pay to avoid a fear of future colonialism.
One might nonetheless object that our mechanism would
introduce an element of colonialism by exacerbating inequality
between rich and poor nations.135 It is true that a market for sovereign
control, like any market, would favor the rich in that they would be
able to buy regional control whereas the poor would only be able to
sell. But, as in those other markets, locking out the poor can harm their
interests more than letting them in. The market would give them a
chance at something better.

132. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 52, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 333, 334.
133. Bautista, supra note 50, at 11 (“Clearly, a treaty of cession is void if it arises out of an act
of annexation procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the U.N. Charter.”).
134. See Jonathan Masters, Why the Crimean Referendum Is Illegitimate, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 16, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/ukraine/why-crimean-referendumillegitimate/p32594 [https://perma.cc/FVV6-QNS3].
135. Indeed, this inequality can happen even in the absence of any coercion or information
failures. See Stuart Banner, Conquest by Contract: Wealth Transfer and Land Market Structure in
Colonial New Zealand, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 47, 49 (2000) (suggesting that problematic land
markets cannot always be explained by the duplicity or failures of the contracting parties).
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We do not doubt the strength of nations’ desire to expand their
sovereign control.136 In fact, we count on it. A market for sovereign
control could transform that demand into value for poorer nations. So
long as the rightful “owners” of the valued good—here, the people of
the territories that rich nations might seek to acquire—have the right
to say no, then the strength of the desire for sovereign control means a
higher price.137 Recognizing, protecting, and facilitating trade in that
right should help alleviate existing inequality.
C. Antidemocracy
There already exists a mechanism by which countries and their
people can choose to alter borders: It’s called democracy. Your
framework would undermine political participation and introduce the
kind of commodification that corrupts democratic values.

Although our framework employs a market mechanism, we are
not attempting to put markets ahead of governance, but rather to
activate a market for governance. The proposal could even be
described as a form of global democracy rather than as a “market” for
sovereign control. Borders would remain important, but people would
be able to look beyond them when choosing their laws and leaders. In
doing so, they could place whatever value they want on “noneconomic”
values and preferences such as stability, cultural similarities, shared
language, and historical affinities.138 Moreover, the “compensation”
given to nations and regions need not be, and almost surely would not
be, purely financial—it might include land swaps, military obligations,
trade agreements, or cultural resources.
Such a mechanism could serve democratic values better than the
current system. As it stands, international law appears to give nations
the power to abdicate sovereign territory without either obtaining
approval from the territory’s residents or giving them a choice
regarding citizenship. For example, the United Kingdom gave up
control of Hong Kong and Kowloon in 1997 despite the fact that
neither the United Kingdom nor China sought the permission of the

136. See supra notes 11–21 and accompanying text.
137. Who “pays” that price is of less import—it might come directly from the acquiring nation
or from the parent nation as a way of obtaining the necessary consent.
138. Michael Ignatieff, Scots Have Revived the Majesty of Democracy, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 19,
2014, 11:23 AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/e2cdcc62-3f5a-11e4-984b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz
4IkeMaP1Q [https://perma.cc/D86F-WN2Z].
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inhabitants of those regions.139 Nor were the citizens of the region
offered U.K. citizenship. The same was true of Portugal and Macau in
1999, Australia and Papua New Guinea in 1975, and many other
situations since World War II. In none of these cases did the colonial
power either obtain popular approval from the inhabitants before
abdicating control or allow them to retain citizenship.140
In other words, borders can and do change hands in the current
system in ways that are far less democratic than what we propose. In
our framework, where rights lie both with the people inhabiting the
region and the parent nation, approval from the inhabitants is a
precondition to any transfer of sovereign control. Concretely, the
United Kingdom would not have been allowed to give away Hong
Kong and Kowloon without prior approval from the citizenry.
Adding a monetary consideration to this process would not make
it any less democratic. Consider an analogy to immigration. Recent
figures suggest that a quarter-billion people—roughly 3 percent of the
world’s population—are migrants.141 They, the countries they left, and
the countries that accepted them have all acted largely on the basis of
economic considerations—a market of sorts.142 Immigrants from poor
countries are attracted by valuable goods such as better educational
opportunities, more jobs, less corruption, lower taxes, cleaner roads,
better health insurance, and so on. Likewise, countries decide which
would-be immigrants to accept based on their current wealth and
future earning potential. Countries ranging from the United States to
Saint Kitts and Nevis facilitate immigration for those who are willing
to invest a certain dollar amount or create a certain number of jobs.143
139. More recently, Gibraltar has unsuccessfully demanded a vote as part of the discussions
between England and Spain about its status. See Gibraltar Demands Veto on Future Status, BBC
NEWS (Oct. 31, 2001, 2:11 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1630056.stm [https://
perma.cc/WW5V-UHU6] (quoting Josep Pique, Spanish Foreign Minister, as stating: “The
people of Gibraltar cannot have the right of veto over matters being discussed by two sovereign
states”).
140. Waters, supra note 19, at 23–25 (describing border changes from World War I through
the Cold War, and noting that “in none of the cases has assignment been subject to approval by
the affected populations”).
141. POPULATION DIVISION, UNITED NATIONS DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS,
POPULATION FACTS 1 (2013), http://esa.un.org/unmigration/documents/The_number_of_inter
national_migrants.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZG6-NCNV].
142. See Ayelet Shachar, Picking Winners: Olympic Citizenship and the Global Race for
Talent, 120 YALE L.J. 2088, 2090 (2011).
143. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act § 203(b)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5) (2012)
(facilitating the approval of green cards for immigrants who invest $1 million or at least $500,000
in targeted employment areas). In some instances, groups of would-be immigrants have worked
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Multiple E.U. nations—including Portugal, Spain, Greece, and
Malta—offer visas and passports to foreigners who are willing to spend
specified amounts of euros purchasing property.144
In short, a “market” for nationality—and therefore sovereign
control—already exists. Selling sovereign control over a particular
territory would mean permitting group or regional immigration, which
would be more democratic than the existing market for immigrants. By
forcing marginalized communities to exercise their exit rights at an
individual level, the current structure reduces their ability to engage in
collective bargaining with their unsatisfactory governments.
Individuals who find themselves unable to fully thrive under a
particular national system but do not have the political clout to produce
local change—for example, Tamils in Sri Lanka, Muslims in Kashmir,
or Rohingya in Myanmar—have an incentive to expend resources to
move, exercising an exit option rather than trying to change or improve
their existing government. Their departure reduces domestic political
pressure and saps the resources of the community they leave behind.
Such market-driven competition is likely to enhance democratic
responsiveness. The desirability of interjurisdictional competition for
citizens has been described as a general matter by Charles Tiebout,145
and within specific areas of law by many others.146 These accounts have
been criticized on the basis that jurisdictional competitions are plagued
by transaction costs because residence is sticky, which means that the
practical and legal barriers to immigration are high. Our proposal
collectively for section 203(b)(5) purposes. See, e.g., David Barer, Chinese Investment Could Kickstart Pflugerville Office Construction, COMMUNITY IMPACT (Nov. 13, 2014), https://
communityimpact.com/austin/news/2014/11/13/chinese-investment-could-kick-start-pflugervilleoffice-construction-2 [https://perma.cc/S3Q6-78H6] (describing “Project Great Wall,” a joint
project in Pflugerville, Texas backed by three dozen Chinese investors seeking green cards);
Smith, supra note 9.
144. Zoe Dare Hall, The Countries Offering Passports to Lure Property Investors, FIN. TIMES
(Mar. 7, 2014, 6:23 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/3d36db18-9fc3-11e3-b6c7-00144feab7de.html
[https://perma.cc/92FN-UM2H]. Though passports are typically sold at the individual level,
Kuwait has recently attempted to purchase Comoros citizenship for its Bidoon population. Peter
Spiro, Kuwait Bulk-Orders Comoros Citizenship for Stateless Bidoon, OPINIO JURIS (Nov. 13,
2014, 11:59 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/11/13/kuwait-bulk-orders-comoros-citizenshipstateless-bidoons [https://perma.cc/TT2M-4W67]. Without the Bidoons’ support, this would not
satisfy our framework.
145. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418
(1956).
146. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1442–58 (1992); Richard L.
Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for
Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1213–27 (1992).
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would overcome these criticisms by bringing the new governing power
to the people, rather than forcing them to go to it.
Elements of this idea are already evident in international practice.
The idea behind free-trade zones—or any choice-of-law system—is to
use elements of another country’s legal regime. Nations commonly set
up special economic zones with distinct rules. The charter-city
movement has sought to establish cities that would be located in poor
countries but governed by the legal and political systems of rich ones.147
A market for sovereign control would add to this process, permitting
an alteration of national borders to reflect the change in governing
authority.
By facilitating exit, the market could arguably corrode democracy
by decreasing the relative value of loyalty and voice,148 lessening
people’s incentive to fix broken systems. But voices for change tend to
be more effective when backed by a credible threat of departure.
Nations that want to keep a dissatisfied region will have more incentive
to be democratically accountable to it. As for commodification itself,
our proposal comes too late to cause additional harm—as noted
above,149 governments already sell public land and yield sovereign
functions. The market would simply combine those transactions.
Two democratic objections remain. First, nations subject to the
liability rule would have no choice but to accept purchased secessions
and realignments from dissatisfied regions, which means that not all
transactions would be fully voluntary. This is true as far as it goes, but
the liability-rule regime only applies to countries that deny
representation or equal rights to their regions, so the net effect on
democratic values would probably be positive. Because nations will
almost certainly want to avoid the liability-rule framework altogether,
they will have an incentive to provide representation and equal rights.
Second, what counts as a legitimate “approval” at the regional or
national level must be determined by reference to domestic standards.
This raises a risk that undemocratic nations will purportedly approve

147. See generally PAUL ROMER, TECHNOLOGIES, RULES, AND PROGRESS: THE CASE FOR
CHARTER CITIES (2010) (arguing that chartering new cities for the purpose of changing and
developing new rules to structure interactions among people will help raise living standards);
Adam Davidson, Honduras Takes a Mulligan, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2012, at MM19 (describing
Romer’s efforts to create a charter city in Honduras).
148. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 31–32 (1970).
149. See supra notes 11–21 and accompanying text.
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sales that are not in the interests of their citizens.150 Hopefully, the
existence of a background market for sovereign control will increase
the incentives for totalitarian regimes to govern well, even if only for
reasons of economic self-interest.
D. Impossibility
Even holding aside the astounding transaction costs, there is no
demand in this supposed “market.” The immigration policy of every
industrialized nation is highly restrictive, which is evidence that they
have no interest in permitting—let alone paying for—the kinds of
changes you envision. Moreover, no nation would ever want to sell,
because no amount of compensation will politically justify the loss of
territory.

A market for sovereign control will not lead to widespread
changes in national borders. On the buyers’ side, the world’s richest
nations will not rush to drain their treasuries by incorporating the
peoples of poor and oppressed regions. Cost aside, such nations have
less need to acquire territory than in the past because they can
increasingly rely on treaties and technology to achieve market access,
protect foreign investments, and project military power. On the sellers’
side, the attachment to land might well be resistant to pricing.
Moreover, domestic political pressure will probably prefer acquisition
or retention of territory—an obvious and tangible thing—to a change
in the inscrutable national balance sheet.
We accept this criticism. Hopefully, a market for sovereignty
can—even if rarely employed, and even if used just once—offer a
workable solution to actual problems, or at least illustrate a way
forward. Our goal here is to add an option, not to ensure that nations
frequently employ it.
The question is what factors would make the mechanism most
desirable and likely to be employed. These factors could include low or
nonexistent population in the region (simplifying the process of
political agreement); economic need or crisis in the parent nation
(increasing the incentive to sell); identifiable physical resources
(making it easier to “value” the region); simple boundaries, as in the
case of islands (making a clean break more straightforward); the
existence of cross-border affinities between the region and another
country (ensuring a desirable bid); “linkages” between regions and
150. For example, a particular region might collude with its own government to approve a
sale that the rest of the country strenuously opposes.
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forms of compensation (enabling dedicated revenue streams that
would encourage transparency and political salience); lack of a history
of violent conflict (improving the odds of peaceful negotiation); and
high-functioning domestic institutions (facilitating information and
reducing transaction costs of agreement).
When these factors are aligned or particularly strong, the market
for a new parent nation should be more desirable, such as in the
following scenarios:
1. The Lingering Colony. Many former colonial powers maintain
outlying territories, often at great expense, and sometimes against the
claims or desires of other nations with a natural territorial affinity.151
The Falkland Islands are an example: the United Kingdom spends
more than $100 million annually on a region that has only three
thousand residents. Argentina wants the islands badly enough to
continue demanding their “return,” thirty years after losing a costly
war. The strength of the demand is undeniable, and the example is not
unique. The British, Dutch, and French all continue to hold sovereign
territory that another nation might value more—think Gibraltar, which
is much desired by Spain, and whose citizens would overwhelmingly
like to stay in the European Union.152
2. The Bad Equilibrium. Some regions are beset with constant and
costly tension, conflict, and suspicion vis-à-vis their parent nations. The
parent nation expends large amounts of resources on law enforcement.
The region suffers socially, economically, and politically. The result is
a bad equilibrium in which each side suspects the other, misinterprets
even well-intentioned actions, and retaliates against perceived slights.
If the conflict were somehow removed, the region could thrive. A new
national identity for the region, in this context, could potentially shift
the relationship to a better equilibrium yielding large economic gains
for all of those involved. If peace could be returned to Kashmir, for
example, it might take advantage of its natural beauty and become a
tourist haven. There would be gains to trade if a deal could be crafted.

151. Another common and perhaps less recognized scenario arises when nations wish to
unburden themselves of expensive former colonies who refuse “independence.” We explore that
issue, and the more general question of expelling regions from nations, in Blocher & Gulati,
Forced Secessions, supra note 88.
152. See Brexit: Spain Calls for Joint Control of Gibraltar, BBC NEWS (June 24, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36618796 [https://perma.cc/4LY5-5FR6].
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3. Ethnic and Cultural Connections. Some rich countries have
ethnic and cultural commonalities with the people in an
underperforming region in a different nation. These affinities give
taxpayers incentive to help their brethren behind other borders
whether by extending citizenship153 or through some other mechanism.
Consider West Germany and East Germany. After the fall of the
Berlin Wall, the richer west expended taxpayer funds to build up the
impoverished east and gave its inhabitants full citizenship rights. This
happened in part because of the ethnic and cultural ties that the
inhabitants of the west felt with those in the east.
4. A Small Oppressed Region. Some rich nations—especially those
that already spend billions on foreign aid—might be willing to absorb
small regions that are being severely oppressed. With taxpayers in
these nations currently contributing money and manpower to
peacekeeping operations,154 altering an undesirable border might be a
better investment. And perhaps the willingness of the population of the
rich nation to take on the burden of helping some poor and
underperforming region will be greater if the people of the rich nation
see that there will not be a massive and immediate influx to their
mainland of migrants who have different religions, sensibilities,
educations, and so on. If the entire region is politically incorporated
into the new nation, there is less need for the people to move.
5. Self-Purchase. Our focus has been on underperforming
regions—those that would need an external buyer or at least external
funding to escape their current situation. But there are rich regions that
might want to alter their national affiliation, or set out on their own.
Such regions might see the remainder of the country as a drain on them,
and there may be basic philosophical or religious differences.
Assuming no oppression or bad governance, such regions would have
to gain the approval of the entire nation, but perhaps their resources
would permit them to buy their way out of a bad relationship.
6. Conflicting Territorial Claims. An enormous proportion of the
world’s borders are subject to dispute. Some disputes may be past the

153. See, e.g., Nick Thorpe, Hungary Creating New Mass of EU Citizens, BBC NEWS (Nov. 7,
2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24848361 [https://perma.cc/G5LB-GEX5] (noting
a new Hungarian law offering citizenship to anyone who has “a direct ancestor who was a
Hungarian citizen, and a basic knowledge of the language”).
154. See supra note 75.
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point of peaceful resolution. Others are minor—conflicting claims to
uninhabited islands, for example—but continue to fester because the
countries involved find it impossible to negotiate. A market for
sovereign control would permit one to offer to buy out the other’s
claim, just as neighboring individuals often do when their property
boundaries are found to conflict.
IV. CAVEATS AND COMPLICATIONS
Any attempted solution to problems as intractable as those
involving territorial sovereignty, border changes, and selfdetermination will be hard to implement. The prior Part tried to
address big-picture objections, but some caveats and complications
remain.
A. Who Gets to Vote?
A change of nationality impacts not just current generations but
future ones. This means that the standard rules regarding who gets to
vote on the decision might need to be modified. Given the impact on
future generations, for example, might one want the voting age for this
decision to be altered? What if a parent nation packs a dissatisfied
region with loyalists—might there be length-of-residence
requirements?
One option here is to rely on domestic law to define voter
eligibility. But this could give the parent nation a way to interfere with
the vote and might exacerbate underlying problems. What if, for
example, a region wants to secede precisely because its nation denies
women the right to vote? These problems are not unique to our
proposal—the question of democratic legitimacy precedes this idea
and will persist after it. Our view is that votes should take place under
international standards, but we have not elaborated what those are.
B. What Counts as a Region?
We do not know what counts as a region, but we are in good
company in that regard. The current right of self-determination as
articulated in international conventions generally accrues to
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“peoples,”155 and no one quite knows what those are either.156 Existing
boundaries can provide some guidance. The boundaries of Scotland,
Kashmir, and Catalonia are reasonably clear, at least on the map.
There are also historically defined regions that remain widely
recognized, even though they have since been broken up to serve other
interests. Kurdistan is a ready example. But there has to be a way to
allow for new regions—those where affiliations are not just a function
of domestic law and history, but also of other factors such as ethnicity,
race, religion, and politics. One of those factors could be “the peoples
who are being systematically disfavored by a nation.”157 In a sense, by
choosing to disfavor a particular region, a country would thereby
establish both the conditions and the scope of the exit right.
C. What About Stateless Peoples?
Dispersed and landless populations get no direct benefit from our
proposal. Even “remedial” secession is not much of a remedy for
people who have been forced to secede. But the logic of the proposal
can still be extended to help them. In a separate paper, we argue that
such refugees effectively constitute the fourth category in our
analysis—rather than simply having a property-rule entitlement in
their own sovereign control (as in the remedial-secession context), they
are in fact owed a debt by the oppressing country.158 That debt should
be tradable so that oppressed populations can treat it as an asset that
can be traded to whichever nation is willing to grant them entry. Other
nations might for example purchase the refugees’ debt and use it to
offset existing sovereign debts held by the oppressing nation.
Illustrations are unfortunately easy to find. As of this writing,
thousands of Rohingya are fleeing Myanmar. If the Rohingya had land
and a clearly identifiable region where they were clustered, they would
fit the remedial-secession category. But most of them have close to
nothing, and whatever little the lucky ones have is being extracted from

155. See G.A. Res. 1514, Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples (Dec. 14, 1960).
156. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 218, ¶ 123 (Can.) (“[T]he precise
meaning of the term ‘people’ remains somewhat uncertain.”); MARCELO G. KOHEN, Introduction
to SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES 1, 6–9 (2006).
157. See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence
in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, 614, ¶ 229 (separate opinion by Cançado
Trindade, J.).
158. See generally Blocher & Gulati, Competing for Refugees, supra note 4 (discussing the
support in international law for the notion that countries of origin owe such a debt).
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them by the military as an exit fee.159 Neighboring nations have refused
them entry. If, however, those nations could benefit from the value of
the refugees’ claim against Myanmar, they might be more welcoming.
D. What About the Rights of Minority Groups Within the Region?
Separatist regions will often contain a minority whose situation
might be made worse off by a transfer.160 A majority vote in the region
itself will not protect them. One might think that the parent country
will protect them, but this is not always the case. Imagine a region with
three ethnic groups. Group A has the majority overall in the parent
country, Group B is a substantial and disfavored second, but Group C
is the majority in the region, with the rest of the population in that
region being Group B. Group A might be happy to transfer Group C’s
region, thereby selling out the members of Group B living in the
region.
One solution would be to make the vote requirement for regional
exit very high (either in terms of turnout or percentage supporting),
such that the majority in any region has to make a deal with the
minority there to obtain its votes. Another possibility is to require that
the citizens in the affected region be given the option to retain their
prior citizenship. Either answer will increase the likelihood of holdout
problems and thus make regional exit less likely. But a world where
regional exit occurs only in extreme situations may be optimal. And it
would also be possible for the dissatisfied section of the transacted
region to realign further, even if that means another subdivision.161
CONCLUSION
Many regions—especially those whose populations are a national
minority—feel oppressed and ill-served by their current countries.
Some try to secede, but such attempts are resisted even in the most
progressive countries. Other regions yearn not to strike out on their
own but to join different countries. This desire is often viewed with

159. Todd Pitman & Esther Htusan, Myanmar Profits Off Rohingya Exodus, CNS NEWS
(Nov. 6, 2014, 8:05 PM), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/ap-exclusive-myanmar-profitsrohingya-exodus [https://perma.cc/SX66-S9AD].
160. Jon Elster, Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe: An Introduction, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 447,
452 (1991) (noting the “minority-within-a-minority” problem).
161. Thomas M. Franck & Paul Hoffman, The Right of Self-Determination in Very Small
Places, 8 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 331, 383 (1975) (“[I]nfinitesimal smallness has never been seen
as a reason to deny self-determination to a population.”).
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even more disfavor. As a result, undesirable borders typically stay in
place until forcibly moved by secession or the intervention of some
powerful external actor. As the situations in Kashmir, Jaffna, Iraq, and
Ukraine illustrate, the byproducts are often violence, instability, and
poverty.
We have tried to show how a “market” mechanism might
ameliorate such problems by facilitating transfers of sovereign territory
between nations while taking seriously the notions of popular
sovereignty and self-determination. We have also tried to answer the
strongest legal, practical, and theoretical arguments against our
proposal. Many readers will remain unconvinced. Even those who
accept the theoretical coherence and desirability of the proposed
changes might still insist that they will never come to fruition in the way
described.
Our hope is that a market for sovereignty can—even if rarely
employed, and even if used just once—offer a workable solution to
actual problems. At the least, like other conceptual frameworks,162 a
market should be able to point toward practical solutions by helping to
identify the legal, political, ethical, or other obstacles that prevent
welfare-enhancing border changes. International law remains haunted
by the problem of borders and sovereign control. Our framework
suggests one way to improve them.

162. The Coase Theorem, to take the most obvious example, is a central tool of legal analysis
despite the fact that—as Coase himself emphasized—the world has transaction costs.

